Excess cash, trading continuity, and liquidity risk by Huang, Winifred & Mazouz, Khelifa
        
Citation for published version:
Huang, W & Mazouz, K 2018, 'Excess cash, trading continuity, and liquidity risk', Journal of Corporate Finance,
vol. 48, pp. 275-291. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.005
DOI:
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.005
Publication date:
2018
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
Publisher Rights
CC BY-NC-ND
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. May. 2019
Accepted Manuscript
Excess cash, trading continuity, and liquidity risk
Winifred Huang, Khelifa Mazouz
PII: S0929-1199(17)30621-1
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.005
Reference: CORFIN 1298
To appear in: Journal of Corporate Finance
Received date: 5 June 2017
Revised date: 24 October 2017
Accepted date: 15 November 2017
Please cite this article as: Winifred Huang, Khelifa Mazouz , Excess cash, trading
continuity, and liquidity risk. The address for the corresponding author was captured
as affiliation for all authors. Please check if appropriate. Corfin(2017), doi:10.1016/
j.jcorpfin.2017.11.005
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As
a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The
manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before
it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may
be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the
journal pertain.
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
1 
 
Excess cash, trading continuity, and liquidity risk   
Winifred Huang
a,*
, Khelifa Mazouz
b 
a 
School of Management, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, United Kingdom 
b 
Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University, Cardiff, CF10 3XQ, United Kingdom 
October 2017 
  
Abstract 
This study investigates the impact of excess cash on the liquidity risk faced by investors and 
their required liquidity premium. It shows that excess cash improves trading continuity and 
reduces both liquidity risk and the cost of equity capital. These findings are consistent with the 
view that firms with excess cash attract more traders even when market liquidity dries up. The 
increase in investors’ trading propensity reduces stock price exposure to shocks to market 
liquidity and the liquidity premium required by investors. We also examine the impact of excess 
cash on firm value. We show that while the direct effect of excess cash on firm value is 
negative, its indirect effect through liquidity is significantly positive, indicating that investors 
are less likely to sanction (or even reward) illiquid firms for holding excess cash. Further 
analysis suggests that the liquidity benefits of excess cash are greater for financially constrained 
firms and firms with high growth opportunities. Our results are robust over time, after 
addressing endogeneity concerns, and to alternative estimation methods and alternative 
measures of liquidity.  
Keywords: Excess cash holdings; Asset liquidity; Stock liquidity; Liquidity risk; Cost of equity 
capital 
JEL classifications: G11; G12; G14 
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1. Introduction 
Cash reserves held by US firms have increased considerably in the last few decades. According 
to Huang et al. (2013), non-financial firms increased their holdings of cash and other liquid 
assets to a record $2 trillion in 2011. Early studies, such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen 
(1986), and Myers and Majluf (1984), have debated the potential costs and benefits of corporate 
cash holdings. Related studies by Opler et al. (1999) and Harford et al. (2008) have investigated 
the effect of various financial variables on the level of corporate cash reserves and identified 
size, book-to-market ratio, and past cash flows as the key determinants of corporate cash 
holdings. More recently, a number of papers have focused on whether investors sanction firms 
for hoarding cash in excess of the level predicted by firm characteristics (“excess cash”). 
However, the results of these studies have been relatively mixed. For example, Simutin (2010) 
documents a positive association between excess cash and stock returns, implying that investors 
view excess cash as a proxy for risky growth opportunities. Nevertheless, Asem and Alam 
(2014) show that the relationship between excess cash and stock returns depends on investors’ 
outlook for firm prospects and conclude that investors’ support for cash hoards is not ubiquitous.   
  In this study, we assess investors’ perceptions of excess cash from a different 
perspective. Specifically, we investigate whether excess cash affects stock trading continuity and 
the liquidity risk faced by investors. Excess cash may affect stock trading continuity and 
liquidity risk in two ways. On the one hand, it is commonly argued that managers hoard cash to 
cushion shortfalls in future cash flows (e.g., Bates et al., 2009; Palazzo, 2012) or to finance 
growth (Simutin, 2010). Consistent with this prediction, Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis 
and Sibilkov (2009) show that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms 
with valuable growth opportunities. Similarly, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) and Brown and 
Petersen (2011) find that the value of cash holdings is highest in R&D intensive firms, as cash 
reserves help these firms avoid the high adjustment costs associated with altering the path of 
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R&D projects. Since cash helps firms finance their profitable investment opportunities and 
survive economic downturns, excess cash may serve as a useful mechanism for firms, 
particularly financially constrained ones and/or those with valuable growth opportunities, to 
attract investors. If firms with excess cash attract more traders when market liquidity dries up, 
their stock prices should exhibit less exposure to shocks to market liquidity. The decrease in 
liquidity risk would, in turn, reduce the liquidity premium and the cost of equity capital. In what 
follows, we will refer to this hypothesis as the investment opportunities hypothesis.  
On the other hand, the theory of free cash flow suggests that managers may hold excess 
cash to pursue their own objectives at shareholders’ expense (Jensen, 1986). These agency 
conflicts are aggravated in the presence of greater information asymmetry, as the lack of 
transparency makes it difficult to monitor or discipline misbehaving managers (Ball et al., 2000, 
2003; Ball, 2006). Johnson et al. (2000) argue that minority shareholders are exposed to greater 
expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders during economic downturns. Because of 
the heightened fear of expropriation, stocks of firms with excess cash reserves may be 
unattractive to investors and may therefore be less liquid. The decline in stock liquidity would 
make the stock price more vulnerable to shocks to market liquidity. As investors face higher 
liquidity risk, they would require a higher liquidity premium, which in turn would increase the 
cost of equity capital. We will refer to this hypothesis in what follows as the management 
entrenchment hypothesis. 
We test the above hypotheses using a large sample of NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common 
stocks over the period 1991 – 2014. Our definition of liquidity risk is based on the premise that 
non-trading reflects illiquidity (Liu, 2006; Lin et al., 2009). Because investors are expected to 
trade only when the benefits of trading exceed trading costs (Lesmond et al., 1999), greater 
incidence of no trading indicates higher (unobservable) trading costs and lower liquidity (Lin et 
al., 2009). While the bid-ask spread has also been commonly used as a trading cost measure, the 
bid and ask quotes are often relevant to small trades, as large transactions are usually negotiated 
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(Lin et al., 2009). Furthermore, Liu (2006) argues that liquidity has multiple dimensions and is 
not well represented by bid-ask spread or any other traditional measure, such as illiquidity 
measure of Amihud (2002) and the turnover measure of Datar et al. (1998). Liu also shows that 
his trading discontinuity measure (LM12), which is defined as standardized turnover-adjusted 
number of zero daily trading volumes over the prior 12 months, is able to capture multiple 
dimensions of liquidity, including trading speed, trading quantity, and trading cost. 
Our analysis provides strong evidence in support of the investment opportunities 
hypothesis and refutes the management entrenchment argument. Specifically, we find a 
significantly negative association between excess cash holdings and Liu’s (2006) LM12, 
consistent with the view that excess cash attracts more traders and reduces incidents of no 
trading. We also find strong evidence that firms with high levels of excess cash exhibit lower 
liquidity risk. All else being equal, a one unit increase in excess cash is associated with an 
average reduction of 0.489 percentage points (or 5.366% relative to the sample mean) per 
annum in the cost of capital, indicating that the economic benefit of excess cash is nontrivial. 
We also evaluate the impact of excess cash on firm value. In addition to the direct effect, we 
show that excess cash affects firm value indirectly through its interaction with the firm’s stock 
liquidity. Specifically, we find that while the direct effect of excess cash on firm value is 
negative, the value of the marginal dollar of excess cash held by illiquid firms is significantly 
higher than that held by more liquid firms. Further analysis suggests that the liquidity benefits of 
excess cash are greater for financially constrained firms and firms with high growth 
opportunities. Our results are robust over time, after addressing endogeneity concerns, and to 
alternative measures of the key variables and alternative estimation methods.  
This study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to investigate the relationship between excess cash and liquidity risk. 
Existing studies (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2012; Charoenwong et al., 2014) focus on the impact of 
asset liquidity, measured as the level of cash in the firm’s balance sheet, on one or a few 
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dimensions of stock liquidity, such as trading volume, bid-ask spread, and Amihud’s illiquidity 
ratio. In this study, we emphasize excess cash for two reasons: (i) excess cash has the potential 
to capture information about firm prospects above and beyond that reflected in the usual proxies 
such as size and book-to-market ratio (Simutin, 2010); and (ii) it is more likely to be wasted by 
entrenched managers (Harford et al., 2008). Further, Liu (2006) argues that, due to the 
multifaceted nature of liquidity, conventional liquidity measures, such as trading volume and 
bid-ask spread, may not fully reflect liquidity. Thus, unlike prior studies, we use Liu’s LM12 to 
capture multiple dimensions of liquidity. We also use liquidity betas estimated from Liu’s 
liquidity-augmented CAPM (LCAPM) to examine the link between excess cash holdings and 
the sensitivity of stock returns to shocks to market liquidity.  
Second, our study contributes to the literature on how cash holding can benefit firms 
facing financing frictions. Several studies argue and show that excess cash can benefit firms by 
minimizing the need to fund future investment opportunities with costly external financing (Kim 
et al., 1998; Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al., 2007). Our study identifies a new channel 
through which excess cash can reduce the cost of financing. Specifically, we argue, and find 
confirming empirical evidence, that excess cash increases trading activity and reduces the 
liquidity premium required by investors. This evidence is particularly strong among financially 
constrained firms and firms with valuable growth opportunities. The liquidity benefits of excess 
is also evident from our analysis of the joint effect of excess cash and stock liquidity on firm 
value. Unlike existing studies, which focus on the direct impact of excess cash on firm value 
(Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Pinkowitz et al., 2006; Pinkowitz and Williamson; 2006), we 
show that excess cash also affects firm value indirectly through its impact on stock liquidity.       
Third, this study improves our understanding of the mechanisms that underlie the 
relation between excess cash holdings and expected stock returns. Simutin (2010) documents a 
positive association between excess cash and future returns. He also shows that high excess cash 
firms have higher market betas and investment expenditures. His findings indicate that high 
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excess cash firms earn higher returns because they are riskier than their low excess cash 
counterparts. Asem and Alam (2014) examine the link between excess cash and stock returns in 
advancing and declining markets. They document an inverted U-shaped relationship when 
investors expect declines in future cash flows and a generally positive relationship when they 
expect increases in growth opportunities. We contribute to this strand of research by providing a 
rationale and evidence on how liquidity risk acts as a channel through which excess cash 
holdings can affect expected stock returns.  
Finally, our study complements the literature exploring the determinants of liquidity risk. 
For example, Ng (2011) reports a negative association between information quality and liquidity 
risk. Cao and Petrasek (2014) find that institutional ownership lowers liquidity betas, consistent 
with Baker and Stein’s (2004) argument that institutional ownership reduces stock returns 
exposure to fluctuations in market liquidity because institutional trades are less likely to be 
motivated by sentiment than individual trades. We extend this line of research by showing that 
excess cash holdings is another important determinant of systematic liquidity risk. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 explains how we measure our key variables 
and specifies the empirical models used for hypothesis testing. Section 4 describes our data and 
summary statistics. Section 5 discusses our main empirical findings. Section 6 reports the results 
of our robustness checks and Section 7 concludes.       
 
2. Related literature and hypothesis development  
In a perfect capital market environment, holdings of cash and liquid assets are irrelevant. This is 
because firms can raise external capital to operate and grow at zero cost. Furthermore, since 
there is no liquidity premium in such an environment, cash holdings have no opportunity cost 
and, therefore, do not affect shareholder wealth (Opler et al., 1999). However, in a world with 
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imperfections, such as information asymmetry, agency conflicts, and financial distress, cash 
reverses can have a significant impact on firm performance and market value.  
Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that information asymmetries between shareholders and 
managers can cause severe underpricing of firm securities and can make it expensive for firms to 
raise external funds. When information asymmetries are high, a cash flow shortfall may involve 
greater costs, as it can prevent firms from financing their operations and investing in profitable 
projects. These costs are expected to be larger for firms with high research and development 
(R&D) expenses (Opler and Titman, 1994) and greater investment opportunities (Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Jung et al., 1996; Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007). Thus, when information 
asymmetries are important, firms can find it profitable to hoard high levels of excess cash in 
order to mitigate costs of financial distress. However, in the presence of agency conflicts, 
managers may hold excess cash to pursue their own objectives rather than maximize 
shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Excess cash provides managers with more 
flexibility in making investment decisions and enables them to avoid market discipline. It also 
allows entrenched managers to increase private benefits of control or engage in empire building 
by undertaking projects that outside investors are not willing to finance (Jung et al., 1996). 
Hence, excess cash can destroy firm value and should optimally be kept low to mitigate the 
conflicts of interests between managers and shareholders (Stulz, 1990). 
 Most of the existing empirical studies evaluate the relative costs and benefits of cash 
holdings by examining the effects of cash reserves on firm performance and market value. 
Unfortunately, the results have been inconclusive. Some studies show that high levels of cash 
destroy shareholder value. For example, Harford (1999) finds that firms with large cash reverses 
are more likely to engage in value destroying acquisitions and capital investments. Similarly, 
Lee and Powell (2011) show that firms that persistently hold excess cash underperform in the 
long-run. Other studies, such as Mikkelson and Partch (2003), find that firms with high cash 
holdings have a higher median operating performance than their low cash holding counterparts. 
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Yet another group of studies documents that the value of excess cash varies with firm 
characteristics. For example, Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Denis and Sibilkow (2009) show 
that the marginal value of cash is higher for financially constrained firms with valuable 
investment opportunities, while Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) find that the marginal value 
of cash is higher in R&D intensive industries. 
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the link between asset liquidity and 
stock liquidity. Gopalan et al. (2012) develop a model in which the relationship between asset 
liquidity and stock liquidity depends on the tendency of the firm to invest. Specifically, liquid 
assets, if not reinvested, would reduce the valuation uncertainty associated with assets-in-place 
and improve stock liquidity. However, reinvesting liquid assets would lead to greater uncertainty 
about future assets and lower stock liquidity. Consistent with their model, Gopalan et al. (2012) 
document a positive association between asset liquidity and stock liquidity and show that this 
relationship is stronger for firms that are less likely to reinvest their liquid assets. Charoenwong 
et al. (2014) also examine the relation between asset liquidity and stock liquidity across 47 
countries. They find that, on average, firms with greater asset liquidity have higher stock 
liquidity. Consistent with the valuation uncertainty argument, they also show that the asset-stock 
liquidity relation is more positive in countries with poor accounting transparency.  
The focus of prior studies has been on the impact of the level of cash holding on the 
conventional measures of stock liquidity, such as bid-ask spread, Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, 
and Datar et al.’s (1998) turnover measure. In this paper, we investigate the impact of cash in 
excess of that of the level required to fund normal operations and investments on both trading 
continuity and liquidity risk. Excess cash is different from the level of cash as it is shown to 
contain important information about firm prospects (Simutin, 2010) and is more likely to be 
wasted by entrenched managers (Harford et al., 2008). Our liquidity proxies are also different 
from the conventional measures of liquidity, which tend to focus on one dimension of liquidity 
and, since liquidity is multifaceted, none of them can capture liquidity risk fully. In this study, 
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we use Liu’s (2006) trading continuity measure (LM12), which is shown to simultaneously 
capture the trading speed, the trading quantity, and the trading cost dimensions of liquidity, as 
our main proxy for liquidity.     
We argue that the impact of cash holdings on trading continuity will depend on the 
ability of firms with excess cash to attract uninformed investors to participate in stock trading. 
The investment opportunities hypothesis suggests that excess cash can reduce the cost of capital 
through two channels: (i) through the efficient utilization of a cheap from of funding (relative to 
equity), which would help firms avoid disruptions to their existing operations and provide 
greater certainty on the funding and implementation of their future investment plans (Opler et 
al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009); and (i) through the reduction of the liquidity premium due to 
increased trading participation. Our study emphasizes the latter. Specifically, we argue that if 
cash holdings lower the volatility in the value of assets-in-place (Gopalan et al., 2012), firms 
with excess cash would attract more investors, particularly uninformed investors. The increased 
participation of uninformed traders would reduce the market makers’ inventory costs and 
adverse selection costs, allowing the latter to provide services at a lower cost. The reduction in 
trading costs would, in turn, increase investors’ propensity to trade and improve trading 
continuity (Lin et al., 2009). As high excess cash improves trading continuity, stock prices of 
firms with excess cash should become more resilient and less sensitive to innovations in 
aggregate market liquidity. The reduced liquidity risk would lower the liquidity premium and 
the cost of equity capital.  
In contrast, the management entrenchment hypothesis predicts a negative association 
between excess cash and trading continuity. Empirical studies on the determinants of cash 
holdings document a significantly positive association between cash holdings and information 
asymmetry (e.g., Dittmar et al., 2003; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; 
Garcia-Teruel et al., 2009). Specifically, these studies show that firms with high levels of 
financially opacity tend to face excessive costs of external finance and are therefore expected to 
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hoard more cash. The high level of information asymmetry can aggravate the agency costs of 
cash (Jensen, 1986) and make firms with excess cash reverses less attractive to uninformed 
traders. The reduced participation of uninformed traders would increase market makers’ losses 
from trading with informed traders and the costs they charge for providing liquidity services. 
The increased trading costs would reduce investors’ propensity to trade and increase the chance 
of firms with excess cash facing trading discontinuity. As the liquidity environment deteriorates, 
stock prices should become less resilient and more exposed to shocks to market liquidity. 
Consequently, investors face greater liquidity risk and require a higher liquidity premium which, 
in turn, increases the cost of equity capital. 
The above arguments suggest that the impact of excess cash on trading continuity, liquidity 
risk, and the cost of equity is theoretically ambiguous. As a result of this ambiguity, we choose 
to address the issue empirically. Throughout our analysis, we focus on the following four 
questions. First, does excess cash improve or worsen trading continuity? Second, does excess 
cash increase or decrease liquidity risk? Third, does excess cash increase or reduce the cost of 
equity capital? Fourth, does excess cash affect firm value? Finally, does the effect of excess cash 
on trading continuity and liquidity risk depend on the firm’s growth opportunities and its access 
to external financing? 
 
3. Measurement of variables and model specification 
3.1. Measurement of trading continuity and liquidity risk 
Following Liu (2006), we measure stock liquidity as the standardized turnover-adjusted number 
of days with zero trading volume over the prior 12 months (LM12): 
𝐿𝑀12 = [𝑍𝐸𝑅𝑂𝑆 +
1/𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅
] ∗
252
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷
     (1) 
where ZEROS is the total number of zero daily trading volume over the prior 12 months, 
TURNOVER is the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months, DEFLATOR is set to 11,000 
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as in Liu (2006) in order to ensure that 0 <
1/𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅
𝐷𝐸𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑅
< 1 for all stocks, and TRAD is the total 
number of trading days over the prior 12 months.  
 This measure is based on the intuition that incidents of no trading reflect higher latent 
costs of trading, with higher values of LM12 indicating low levels of trading continuity and high 
degrees of illiquidity (Lin et al., 2009). It also captures the multifaceted aspects of liquidity, 
placing particular emphasis on trading speed, which has been largely ignored in the previous 
studies (Liu, 2006). 
 After calculating LM12, we use Liu’s (2006) two-factor model and estimate liquidity risk 
by running the following time-series regression for each firm and every year over our sample 
period:
 1 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑚(𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡,𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2) 
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 , 𝑟𝑓𝑡 , and  𝑟𝑚𝑡  are monthly returns on firm i, the US market, and the one-month 
Treasury bill2;  𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡,𝑖 is the liquidity mimicking factor, defined as the return difference between 
a low-liquidity portfolio (containing high LM12 stocks) and a high liquidity portfolio (containing 
low LM12)
3
;  and the factor loadings 𝛽𝑖𝑚 and 𝛽𝑖𝑙 represent the stock i’s market beta and liquidity 
risk, respectively. 
 
                                            
1
 Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure liquidity risk as the sensitivity of stock returns to innovations in 
market-wide liquidity. However, their measure is designed to capture the illiquidity that relates to the 
price of impacts of trades rather than the liquidity risk stemming from trading discontinuity (Lin et al., 
2009) and works better for portfolios than individual stocks (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003).   
2
 Data on 𝑟𝑓𝑡, and  𝑟𝑚𝑡 is obtained from Kenneth French’s website: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html 
3
 We are very grateful to Weimin Liu for providing us with his liquidity factors. For more details on the 
construction of these factors refer to Liu (2006, pp. 550-551). 
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3.2. Measurement of excess cash  
Following others (e.g., Opler et al., 1999; Harford et al., 2008; Asem and Alam, 2014), each 
year, we estimate excess cash for firm i as the residual of the following cross-sectional 
regression: 
𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐹𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑇𝐵𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛼5𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑖
+ 𝛼6𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐸𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼7𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖 + 𝛼8𝑅&𝐷𝑖 + 𝛼9𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖 + 𝛼10𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
     (3) 
where CASH is the natural log of cash and short-term investments scaled by net assets;  CF is 
earnings after interest, dividends, and taxes, but before depreciation scaled by net assets;  
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to net assets;  MTB is the market value of assets divided by 
total assets; SIZE is the natural log of net assets deflated in 1994 dollars; NWC is net working 
capital (net of cash), scaled by net assets; CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by net assets;  
DIV is a dummy variable with a value of one if the firm pays dividends, and zero otherwise; 
R&D is the research and development expenditures scaled by sales; REG is a dummy which 
equals one if the firm is in a regulated industry, and zero otherwise;
4
 INDSIG is industry cash 
flow risk, defined as the mean of the ratio of the standard deviations of cash flows to the total 
assets over 20 years for firms in the same industry (by 2-digit SIC code).  
All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles to mitigate outlier effects. 
The exponential form of residual 𝜀𝑖 is used as a proxy for firm i’s excess cash (ECASH) in a 
given year. A positive (negative) residual indicates that the firm hoards more (less) cash than it 
needs for its normal operational activities and investments during that year. 
 
                                            
4
 As per Barclay and Smith (1995), regulated industries are railroads (SIC code 4011), trucking (SIC 
code 4210 and 4213), airlines (SIC code 4512), and telecom (SIC code 4812 and 4813). 
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3.3. Model specification 
To test the effects of excess cash on trading continuity and liquidity risk, we estimate the 
following regression:
5  
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡     (4) 
where subscripts i and t represent firm and year, respectively; 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌  represents firm 
liquidity and is measured in the following two different ways: (a) as the natural logarithm of 
Liu’s (2006) LM12 (𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑀12) and (b) as the liquidity beta (𝛽𝑖𝑙) in Equation (2) (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴); 
𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻 is the cash in excess of normal operations and investments, estimated as the exponential 
form of the residual term in Equation (3); 𝑍i,t-1 is a vector of control variables, which are lagged 
one year to mitigate reverse causality concerns; 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 and 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 are year and industry 
dummies, respectively; and 𝜑 is a residual error term.  
Building on the related literature (e.g., Brockman et al., 2009; Lin et al., 2009; Ng, 
2011), we include in our regressions several control variables that are known to affect stock 
liquidity. These variables are market-to-book ratio (MTB), firm size (SIZE), leverage 
(LEVERAGE), a dummy for dividend payers (DIV), capital expenditures (CAPEX), R&D 
expenses (R&D), stock price (PRICE), stock return (RET), the number of shareholders 
(NSHAR), block ownership (BLOCK), institutional ownership (IO), and a dummy for NASDAQ 
stocks (NASDAQ). Following Lin et al. (2009), we also add 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑀12  to the list of control 
variables when 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴  is used as the dependent variable in Equation (4). Appendix A 
provides a detailed definition of all variables used in our regressions. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentiles. We further include 
year and industry dummies to control for potential year and industry fixed effects. Finally, we 
use robust standard errors that are adjusted for double clustering by firm and year.   
 
                                            
5
 We also use cash instead of excess cash as our main independent variable and our conclusion remains 
unchanged. Further details on these results are available upon request.   
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4. Data and summary statistics 
Our initial sample consists of all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ common stocks of US industrial 
firms, excluding utilities (SIC 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC 6000-6999), with available 
accounting data from Compustat at any time during the period of 1991 – 2014. Stock price data 
is collected from CRSP. Ownership data is obtained from Worldscope and Thomson Reuters 
Institutional (13F) Holdings. To ensure the firms are publicly traded, we only include firms that 
have securities with CRSP share codes of 10 or 11. We also exclude stocks with share prices of 
less than $5 or greater than $1000 and those traded for less than 200 days in the previous year.
6
 
To mitigate any potential bias from the small size effect, we also exclude firms with market 
capitalizations of less than 10 million dollars. Finally, to reduce the effect of outliers, we 
exclude firms with negative assets, negative sales, and those with annual assets or sales growth 
larger than 100%. The final sample includes 3,810 firms and 28,310 firm-years.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 reports the firm characteristics for the full sample and the subsamples by 
exchange listing. It shows that NASDAQ firms are smaller, have a smaller shareholder base, and 
are traded less frequently than the NYSE/AMEX firms. It also shows that firms traded on 
NASDAQ have greater growth opportunities, hold more cash, and pay less dividends than those 
traded in NYSE/AMEX. These findings provide initial evidence consistent with the view that 
managers hoard cash to cushion shortfalls in future cash flows and/or to finance growth (Bates et 
al., 2009; Simutin, 2010; Palazzo, 2012).  
Table 2 presents the unconditional correlations across firm-years between the various 
variables included in our analysis. The highest correlation is between INVESTOR and SIZE 
                                            
6
 Amihud (2002) argues that excluding stocks that are traded less than 200 days in the previous year 
helps to mitigate the potential effect of thin trading problems on the results.  
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(0.56), which indicates that large firms attract more investors and therefore have a larger 
investor base. The correlation between PRICE and SIZE is also relatively high (0.53). The 
correlation between DIVIDEND and NASDAQ is -0.34, implying that firms listed on NASDAQ 
stock exchange are less likely to pay dividends. The correlation between lnLM12 and LIQBETA 
is positive and significant, implying that trading discontinuity increases liquidity risk. This result 
is consistent with Acharya and Pedersen (2005), who report a negative association between 
liquidity risk and liquidity level. The correlation between ECASH and lnLM12 is significantly 
negative (-0.06), while that between ECASH and LIQBETA is positive and significant (0.07), 
providing preliminary evidence in support of our investment opportunities hypothesis, which 
suggests that excess cash increases trading continuity and reduces liquidity risk.  
We use variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis to diagnose multicollinearity. The mean 
VIF of the variables is 1.57, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious problem in our 
study.   
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5. Empirical Findings 
5.1. Core findings 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating Equation (4). The first four columns present the results 
with lnLM12 as the dependent variable. Column (1) reports the results with excess cash as the 
only explanatory variable. It shows that the coefficient on ECASH is negative and highly 
significant, with a 1% increase in excess cash resulting in a 3.9% decrease in lnLM12. Column 
(2) shows that the significantly negative effect of excess cash on trading discontinuity remains 
after controlling for other determinants of stock liquidity. Columns (3) and (4) present the results 
for the two subsamples by exchange listing. While the coefficient on ECASH is significantly 
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negative in both subsamples, its magnitude is more than double for the NASDAQ than the 
NYSE/AMEX firms. Specifically, we find that a 1% increase in excess cash increases liquidity 
(i.e. decreases lnLM12) by 1.9% for NYSE/AMEX firms and 5.8% for NASDAQ firms. These 
findings are consistent with the investment opportunities hypothesis, which predicts the liquidity 
benefits of excess cash to be stronger for smaller firms with greater growth opportunities (Opler 
et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009).    
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
Columns (5) to (8) report the results of Equation (4) with 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴 as the dependent 
variable. The coefficient on ECASH in column (5) is negative and significant, implying that 
excess cash reduces liquidity risk. In economic terms, a 1% increase in excess cash lowers 
liquidity risk by 5.6%. This finding is robust after controlling for other determinants of liquidity 
risk (column (6)). Columns (7) and (8) show that the coefficients on ECASH for the subsamples 
of NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms are -0.041 (t-value = -4.188) and -0.074 (t-value = -
4.519), respectively, implying that the liquidity benefits from holding excess cash are stronger 
for NASDAQ firms. This evidence is again consistent with the investment opportunities 
hypothesis, which posits that small firms with high growth opportunities are more likely to 
benefit from holding excess cash.  
To derive a better understanding of the economic significance of our results, we quantify 
the effects of excess cash on the cost of capital through liquidity risk. Following Lin et al. (2009) 
and Ng (2011), we estimate the liquidity risk premium per unit of liquidity risk (𝐸(𝐿𝐼𝑄)) as the 
long-term average of the liquidity mimicking factor (LIQ). Since we are using monthly data to 
estimate LIQBETA, we estimate the annualized reduction in the cost of equity capital associated 
with a 1% increase in excess cash by compounding 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴 ∗ 𝐸(𝐿𝐼𝑄) for 12 months. The 
value of 𝐸(𝐿𝐼𝑄) during the period 1991 – 2014 is 0.69% per month, which is similar to Liu 
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(2006) and Lin et al. (2009).
7
  Column (6) suggests that a one unit increase in excess cash is 
associated with an average reduction of 0.065 in liquidity risk, which translates into an average 
reduction of 0.54 (i.e., (1+(0.065*0.69%))
12
 – 1) percentage points per annum in the liquidity 
premium required by investors. This is a nontrivial reduction, as it represents 5.816% of average 
cost of equity for the sample firms.
8
 Columns (7) and (8) show that a one unit increase in excess 
cash is associated with an average reduction of 0.043 and 0.082 in the liquidity risk for the 
subsamples of NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ firms, respectively. This indicates that, all else 
equal, a one unit increase in excess cash lowers the cost of capital for NYSE/AMEX and 
NASDAQ firms by 0.357 and 0.681 percentage points per annum, respectively.  
Among the control variables in Table 3, firm size and book-to-market ratio are 
negatively associated with trading discontinuity and liquidity risk, a result consistent with Cao 
and Petrasek (2014). Stock price is positively related to trading discontinuity and liquidity beta, 
consistent with the view that low-priced stocks attract more informed traders (see, e.g., Schultz, 
2000; Easley et al., 2001). Prior return is negatively related to trading discontinuity and liquidity 
risk, indicating that firms whose stocks have recently performed well attract more traders and 
hence exhibit a lower exposure to innovations in aggregate liquidity. Trading discontinuity and 
liquidity betas are also smaller for firms with higher capital expenditures and higher R&D 
expenditures. Furthermore, the effects of leverage, dividends, and investor base on trading 
discontinuity and liquidity beta are positive and significant at the 1% level. Moreover, we show 
that block shareholding is significantly negatively related to trading continuity, suggesting that 
block ownership is detrimental to the firm’s trading activities (Brockman et al., 2009). 
Institutional ownership also has a significantly positive effect on both trading continuity and 
                                            
7
 The estimated monthly mean values of LIQ documented in Liu (2006) and Lin et al. (2009) are 0.749% 
(1964-2003) and 0.76% (1975-2004), respectively. 
8
 We estimate the average cost of equity capital (𝐸(𝑟𝑖)) using the following LCAPM model: 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) − 𝑟𝑓 =
 𝛽𝑖𝑚(𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖𝑙𝐸(𝐿𝐼𝑄), where 𝐸(𝑟𝑚), 𝐸(𝐿𝐼𝑄) and 𝑟𝑓 are the long-term averages of the market 
return, liquidity mimicking factor and risk free rate, respectively. During the sample period, we have 𝑟𝑓 = 
0.22%, (𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓) = 0.65%, and 𝐸(𝐿𝐼𝑄) = 0.69%. We estimate the cost of equity capital per annum 
by compounding 𝐸(𝑟𝑖) over 12 months. The average cost of capital for our sample firms is about 9.28%.     
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liquidity risk, consistent with Gompers and Metrick (2001) and Bennett et al. (2003).  In the 
regressions with LIQBETA as the dependent variable, the coefficient on lnLM12 is positive and 
significant, implying that trading discontinuity increases stock price vulnerability to shocks to 
market liquidity (see, e.g., Liu, 2006; Lin et al., 2009). Nevertheless, none of these variables 
subsume the effect of excess cash on trading continuity and liquidity beta. Specifically, we show 
that excess cash alone accounts for 7.9% of the cross-sectional variation in lnLM12, whereas the 
adjusted R
2
 is 26% after including the control variables. We also show that excess cash accounts 
for 3.1% of the variation in liquidity betas and the adjusted R
2 
increases to 4.4% after controlling 
for other determinants of liquidity risk.  
To gain further insight into the liquidity benefit of excess cash, we fit the following 
regression:
9
 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡 = 𝜅0 + 𝜅1𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜅2𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜅3𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡                                                                         (5) 
where 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is a proxy for firm value and is defined as the ratio of market value of assets (book 
value of assets minus book value of equity plus market value of equity) to book value of assets 
(see, e.g., Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Servaes (1991), and Nohel and Tarhan (1998).
10
 The 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 
is a vector of lagged control variables, which includes firm size (SIZE), daily turnover by 
volume (TURNOVER), long-term debt divided by total assets (LTD), a dummy for dividend 
payers (DIV), capital expenditures (CAPEX), return on assets (ROA). The choice of these 
variables is guided by the literature on determinants of firm value (see, e.g., Allayannis and 
Weston, 2001; Carter et al., 2006; Roll et al., 2009) and their detailed definitions are provided in 
the Appendix. The rest of variables in Equation (5) are as defined in Section 3.3.  
                                            
9
 We are grateful to anonymous referee for making this suggestion.   
10
 For robustness purposes, we also define Q as the ratio of market value of firm (market value of equity 
plus book value of debt) to book value of firm (total assets)  (see, e.g., Chung and Pruitt, 1994; Pinkowitz 
et al., 2006). The results of these analysis are available upon request. 
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 Table 4 reports the results for different specifications of Equation (5). The coefficient on 
𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 is negative and significant, indicating that shareholders value the marginal dollar of 
excess cash significantly lower than its face value. Similar results are reported by Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2007) and Dittmr and Mahrt-Smith (2007), who examined the impact of the level 
of cash holdings on firm value.
11
 The coefficient on lnLM12 is negative and significant, 
suggesting that trading discontinuity is detrimental to firm value. This finding is consistent with 
the evidence in Fang et al. (2009), which also shows that stock liquidity improves firm value. 
The interaction terms in Columns (1) and (2) are positive and significant, implying that the value 
of the marginal dollar of excess cash held by illiquid firms is significantly higher than that held 
by more liquid firms. This finding is again consistent with predictions of our investment 
opportunities hypothesis. 
 Most of the control variables in the regressions are significant. The significantly positive 
coefficient on firm size is consistent with Mueller’s (1987) view that big firm size implies 
greater efficiency, as it might an outcome of a firm’s exploration and exploitation activities. 
Share turnover is also positive and significant, indicating the presence of liquidity premium in 
stock returns (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). The positive coefficient on capital expenditure 
indicates that firms that invest more may have greater growth opportunities and higher valuation 
(Roll et al., 2009). Leverage is significantly negative, presumably reflecting the distress costs 
associated with having debt in the capital structure. Finally, the significantly negative coefficient 
on the dividend dummy suggests that dividend paying firms are less constrained and therefore 
have more free cash flow, which can potentially be wasted by entrenched managers (Harford et 
al., 2008).       
                                            
11
 Existing evidence shows that the impact of cash holdings on firm value varies systematically across 
firms with corporate characteristics. For example, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2007) show cash is value 
at a premium when it is by riskier companies with growth opportunities and at discount when held by 
mature firms with less volatile cash flow. In a similar vein, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) find that 
cash holdings by well-governed firms tend to command premium values while cash holding by poorly 
governed firms tend to be penalized by market investors.      
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
 In summary, our results provide strong support of the investment opportunities 
hypothesis, which suggests that excess cash improves trading continuity and reduces the 
sensitivity of stock prices to shocks to aggregate liquidity. We also show that while the direct 
effect of excess cash on firm value is negative, its indirect effect through liquidity is 
significantly positive, indicating that shareholders are less likely to sanction (or even reward) 
firms with high trading discontinuity and liquidity risk for  holding excess cash. These findings 
remain robust after controlling for other well-known determinants of stock liquidity and firm 
value. 
 
5.2. Additional analysis and robustness tests 
In this section, we conduct numerous tests to check the robustness of our results after adjusting 
for endogeneity and to alternative estimation methods, alternative measures of the key variables, 
and alternative subsamples and time periods.  
 
5.2.1. Endogeneity concerns 
The documented negative effects of excess cash on trading continuity and liquidity risk might be 
endogenous for two reasons. First, omitted variables that are correlated with both liquidity and 
excess cash may bias our estimates towards our baseline results. Second, stock liquidity may 
also influence a firm’s decision to hoard cash (Gopalan et al., 2012), implying that causality 
might operate in the reverse direction. Although the use of fixed effects and the extensive set of 
control variables may have already absorbed the effects of a wide array of omitted variables and 
the use of lagged independent variables may have alleviated concerns of reverse causality, the 
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endogeneity issues relating to both omitted variables and reverse causality may not be fully 
resolved. 
 To further alleviate these endogeneity concerns, we use an instrument variable (IV) 
approach as an identification strategy to test the effects of excess cash on trading discontinuity 
and liquidity risk. We estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) IV regressions with industry and 
year fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the firm level. In the first stage, we regress 
ECASH on a selected instrumental variable and a set of control variables. Admittedly, finding a 
variable based on economic theory that predicts excess cash but not trading continuity or 
liquidity risk is quite challenging. Nevertheless, we use the natural logarithm of the industry 
average excess cash (IECASH) as our instrument.
12
 IECASH is likely to be related to firm-level 
excess cash as firms in the same industry may adopt a similar cash holding policy. Furthermore, 
although the liquidity characteristics of a given firm might influence the same firm’s excess cash 
holdings, they are unlikely to be related to industry-level excess cash holdings. Managers may 
also have influence over their own firm’s excess cash holdings, but they should have limited 
influence, if any, on other firms’ excess cash holding policies. Thus, IECASH should be a valid 
instrument, as it is likely to be related to firm-level excess cash, but not to trading discontinuity 
or liquidity risk. The F-statistic from the Kleibergen-Paap test is significant, indicating that 
IECASH is not a weak instrument.     
 Table 4 presents the results of the 2SLS IV regressions. Columns (1) and (3) present the 
results of the first stage with ECASH as the dependent variable. The coefficients on IECASH is 
positive and significant, suggesting that firm level and industry level excess cash are positively 
related to one another. We use the predicted values of ECASH from the first-stage regression in 
the second stage equation. Columns (2) and (4) report the second stage results using lnLM12 and 
LIQBETA as liquidity proxies, respectively. The results continue to show a negative relation 
                                            
12
 The use of the industry average of the main explanatory variable as an instrument variable in 2SLS is 
common in the literature (see, e.g., John and Knyazeva, 2006; John and Kadyrzhanova, 2008; Jiraporn et 
al., 2011; Ghaly et al., 2015).  
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between ECASH and both lnLM12 and LIQBETA, which suggests a casual relation from excess 
cash to both trading discontinuity and liquidity risk. Overall, the results in Table 4 are consistent 
with the predictions of the investment opportunities hypothesis, which suggests that excess cash 
improves trading continuity and reduces stock price exposure to innovations in aggregate 
liquidity.     
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
5.2.2. Alternative estimation methods 
In our earlier analysis, we use robust standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelations in the residuals of the pooled OLS regression. For robustness purposes, we also 
use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression method to account for the cross-correlations and 
the serial correlations in the residual terms. Specifically, each year we estimate cross-sectional 
regressions of firm liquidity on excess cash and other control variables. We then average the 
yearly cross-sectional slope coefficients to obtain the final estimates and use the time series of 
the coefficient estimates to compute standard errors.  
Table 5 presents the Fama-MacBeth estimates with lnLM12 (column (1)) and LIQBETA 
(column (2)) as the dependent variable, respectively. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
the Newey and West (1987) heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors. 
The coefficient on ECASH is significantly negative in both columns, indicating that firms with 
high excess cash on average trade more frequently and have lower liquidity risk than those with 
low excess cash.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
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5.2.3. Alternative measures of liquidity 
To further examine the robustness of our results, we use the illiquidity ratio by Amihud (2002) 
and the bid-ask spread as alternative liquidity measures. The illiquidity ratio is defined as the 
average of the daily ratio between the absolute value of the stock’s return and its dollar volume 
over the prior 12 months, where the final value is multiplied by (106). The bid-ask spread is 
defined as the average value of the daily difference between the ask price and bid price, divided 
by the ask price, over the past 12 months.  
The results are reported in Table 6 (see Panel A for Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure 
and Panel B for the Amihud and Mendelson’s (1986) bid-ask spread). The coefficient on 
ECASH is negative and significant at the 1% level, except for the subsample of NYSE/AMEX 
firms when the bid-ask spread is used as the liquidity measure. Overall, our findings suggest that 
excess cash reduces illiquidity and trading costs and the reduction is larger for NASDAQ firms, 
consistent with the predictions of the investment opportunities hypothesis.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
5.2.4. The role of financial constraints and growth opportunities 
Existing studies show that cash holdings are more valuable for financially constrained firms 
(see, e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Faulkender and Wang, 2006; Chan et al., 2012) and for firms 
with growth opportunities (see, e.g., Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2007; Denis and Sibilkov, 2009; 
Brown and Petersen, 2011). In this section, we investigate whether the extra benefits of holding 
excess cash that accrue to these types of firms can be at least partly attributed to the reduction in 
their liquidity risk. Following existing studies (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Acharya et al., 2007; 
Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016), we use firm size, dividends, credit rating, the KZ index of 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997), the WW index of Whited and Wu (2006), and the HP index of 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) as proxies for financial constraints. More specifically, at the 
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beginning of every year, we define financially constrained firms as those: (i) in the bottom three 
size deciles; (ii) that do not pay dividends; (iii) that do not have credit ratings; (iv) in the top 
three KZ index deciles; (v) in the top three WW index deciles; and (vi) in the top three HP index 
deciles. The definition of each financial constraint proxy is given in Appendix A. Following the 
literature (see, e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; Bates el al., 2009), we also 
use book-to-market equity ratios, R&D expenses and capital expenditures as proxies for growth 
opportunities. At the beginning of each year, we use the mean value of each proxy for growth 
opportunities to recognize a firm as high (low) growth firm if its growth opportunities are above 
(below) the mean. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
To test whether the liquidity benefits of holding excess cash accrues more to financial 
constrained firms or to firms with growth opportunities, we modify our baseline equation as 
follows: 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑈𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽0𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼1𝐷𝑈𝑀 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑀 +  𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜑𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                      (6) 
 
where 𝐷𝑈𝑀 is a dummy variable that is defined either as FC, which takes a value of one if the 
firm is financially constrained, and zero otherwise or GO, which equals to one for firms with 
high growth opportunities, and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are as defined in Section 
3.3. Our variable of interest is the interaction term (𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐷𝑈𝑀). When 𝐷𝑈𝑀 is set to 
equal FC, a significantly negative (positive) 𝛽1  would suggest that the liquidity benefits of 
excess cash is significantly higher (lower) for financially constrained firms than unconstrained 
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firms. Similarly, when 𝐷𝑈𝑀 is set to equal GO, a significantly negative (positive) 𝛽1 would 
imply that excess cash brings more (less) liquidity benefits to growth firms than value firms.    
 Table 7 presents the results of the various specification of Equation (6). Panel A reports 
the results for financially constrained and unconstrained firms. When lnLM12 is used as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on 𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐶 is negative and significant across all of 
the constraints measures, except KZ index, suggesting that the improvement in trading 
continuity associated with holding excess cash is greater for financial constrained firms. The 
coefficient on 𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐹𝐶 is also negative and significant for four out of the six constraints 
measures when LIQBETA is used as the dependent variable. For the remaining two 
classifications, namely credit ratings and KZ index, the magnitude of the ECASH coefficient is 
almost the same for the constrained and unconstrained firms. Nevertheless, Hadlock and Pierce 
(2010) and Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2016) show that the dividend payout is unlikely to 
measure financial constraints and credit ratings are more likely to capture firm size and age 
rather than financial constraints. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) suggest that the KZ index is not 
related to firm characteristics that are believed to be associated with financial constraints and it 
is therefore unlikely to be a measure of financial constraints. Given these criticisms, we base our 
conclusions on more recently developed proxies for financial constraints, namely the WW index 
and the HP index, which suggest that excess cash reduces trading discontinuity and liquidity risk 
and the effect is greater for constrained firms. 
Panel B reports the results for the high and low growth firms. In the specification where 
lnLM12 is the dependent variable, the coefficient on 𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝑂 is negative and highly 
significant when R&D and CAPEX are used as growth opportunity measures. When LIQBETA 
is the dependent variable, the coefficient 𝐸𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐺𝑂 is negative, but only significant when 
R&D is used as the growth opportunities measure. These findings suggest that excess cash 
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reduces trading discontinuity and liquidity risk and the effect is generally stronger for firms with 
greater growth opportunities.   
Overall, our results suggest that the reduction in trading discontinuity and liquidity risk 
associated with holding excess cash is greater for financially constrained firms and firms with 
high growth opportunities, consistent with our investment opportunities hypothesis.    
 
5.2.5. The role of crisis 
Duchin et al. (2010) show that firms rely more heavily on cash holdings to finance their 
investments during the 2008 financial crisis. They also show that cash-rich firms outperform 
cash-poor firms during the recent financial crisis. This evidence suggests that investors perceive 
firms with excess cash as good investments during economic downturns and that the liquidity 
benefits of excess cash may be unique to the crisis periods. To investigate this possibility, we 
split our sample into crisis and non-crisis periods and present the results in Table 8. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results for the periods before 2008, between 2008 and 
2009, and after 2009. The coefficient on ECASH is significantly negative across the three sub-
periods, suggesting that the liquidity benefits of excess cash are not unique to the recent global 
financial crisis. To further investigate the role of the crisis, we use information on the US 
business cycle expansions and contractions available from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) and identify the years 1991, 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009 as crisis years. Panel 
B present the results for the crisis and non-crisis periods. We find that excess cash improves 
trading continuity in both crisis and non-crisis periods. We also find that excess cash reduces 
liquidity betas, but this effect is significant only in the non-crisis periods. These results refute the 
view that the liquidity benefits of excess cash are specific to economic downturns.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------   
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6. Conclusion 
Existing empirical studies on cash holdings focus mainly on the effects of corporate cash 
reserves on firm value and firm performance (e.g., Mikkelson and Partch, 2003; Pinkowitz and 
Williamson, 2007; Brown and Peterson, 2011). In this paper, we assess the costs and the benefits 
of excess cash by investigating the link between excess cash and the liquidity risk faced by 
investors and their required liquidity premium. To this end, we propose and test two competing 
hypotheses. The investment opportunities hypothesis asserts that excess cash reduces the 
volatility in the value of assets-in-place and attracts more uninformed trading, which, in turn, 
reduces trading costs, increases trading continuity, and reduces liquidity risk. In contrast, the 
management entrenchment hypothesis suggests that managers hoard cash to pursue their own 
objectives at shareholder expense. The growing fear of expropriation renders firms with excess 
cash unattractive to uninformed traders. The reduced participation of these traders, in turn, 
increases the cost at which market makers provide liquidity services, reduces investors’ 
propensity to trade and increases liquidity risk. 
 We examine a large sample of US stocks and find evidence consistent with the 
investment opportunities hypothesis. Specifically, we show that excess cash reduces incidents of 
no trading and reduces stock price vulnerability to shocks to market liquidity. As investors face 
reduced liquidity risk, they require a lower liquidity premium. In terms of economic 
significance, our analysis suggests that a one unit increase in excess cash is associated with a 
0.06 decline in liquidity beta, which translates into an average reduction of 0.489 percentage 
points (or 5.366% relative the sample mean) per annum in the cost of equity capital. We also 
investigate the impact of excess cash holdings on firm value. We show that while the direct 
effect of excess cash on firm value is negative, its indirect effect through liquidity is positive. 
Specifically, we find that the value to the marginal dollar of excess cash held by illiquid firms is 
significantly higher than that held by more liquid firms. Further analysis suggests that liquidity 
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benefits of excess cash are higher for financial constrained firms and firms with high growth 
opportunities. Our results are robust over time, after addressing potential endogeneity issues, and 
to alternative estimation methods and alternative measures of liquidity. 
 Overall, this study contributes to literature on the link between cash holdings and stock 
liquidity (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2012; Charoenwong et al., 2014) by showing that excess cash 
improves trading continuity and liquidity risk. It also adds to the stream of studies on the link 
between corporate liquidity management and the expected equity returns (e.g., Palazzo, 2009; 
Simutin, 2010; Asem and Alam, 2014) by identifying liquidity risk as a channel through which 
excess cash can affect the cost of equity capital. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature by 
identifying liquidity as a new channel through which excess cash can affect firm value. Finally, 
we advance the literature on liquidity risk (e.g., Liu, 2006; Ng., 2011; Cao and Petrasek, 2014) 
by showing that excess cash is an important determinant of the liquidity beta. 
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Table 1  
Sample characteristics by stock market exchanges and trading continuity. 
This table reports the mean and the median (in parentheses) of the dependent and independent variables 
used in our regression models over the period 1991-2014. lnLM12 is a natural logarithm of Liu’s (2006) 
trading continuity measure (LM12) and LIQBETA is the liquidity beta from Liu’s (2006) liquidity-
augmented CAPM (LCAMP). ECASH is the excess cash estimated as the residual of Equation (3); MTB 
is market value of assets divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of net assets deflated in 1994 
dollars; LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt scaled by net assets; DIV is a dummy variable with a value 
of one if a firm pays dividend, and zero otherwise; CAPEX is capital expenditures scaled by net assets; 
R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by sales; PRICE is the stock price; RET is the stock 
return; NSHAR is the number of shareholders; BLOCK is the total block ownership; IO is the total shares 
outstanding held by 13F institutions; NASDAQ is a dummy variable equal to one for NSADAQ stocks, 
and zero otherwise. The values of ECASH, MTB, SIZE, LEVERAGE, DIV, CAPEX, R&D, PRICE, RET, 
NSHAR, BLOCK, IO and NASDAQ are lagged in one period. Detailed variable definitions and sources 
are provided in Appendix A.  
 
 Full sample NYSE/AMEX NASDAQ 
 (N=28,310) (N=15,018) (N=13,292)  
lnLM12 0.321 0.224 0.432 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
LIQBETA -0.222 -0.156 -0.297 
 
[-0.140] [-0.082] [-0.231] 
ECASH 0.039 -0.052 0.143 
 
[0.204] [0.083] [0.341] 
MTB 2.020 1.828 2.237 
 
[1.589] [1.519] [1.706] 
SIZE 5.959 6.817 4.991 
 
[5.938] [6.816] [4.951] 
LEVERAGE 0.237 0.267 0.203 
 
[0.206] [0.252] [0.124] 
DIV 0.451 0.612 0.269 
 
[0.000] [1.000] [0.000] 
CAPEX 0.070 0.068 0.073 
 
[0.050] [0.050] [0.051] 
R&D 0.094 0.024 0.173 
 
[0.002] [0.000] [0.014] 
PRICE 26.197 31.615 20.076 
 
[20.600] [26.510] [15.000] 
RET 0.190 0.176 0.205 
 
[0.097] [0.112] [0.075] 
NSHAR 1.387 1.739 0.989 
 
[1.037] [1.447] [0.655] 
BLOCK 22.921 20.631 25.508 
 [17.360] [14.610] [20.770] 
IO 51.343 54.701 47.548 
 [57.295] [62.934] [49.122] 
NASDAQ 0.470 0.000 1.000 
 
[0.000] [0.000] [1.000] 
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Table 2  
Correlation matrix of the dependent and independent variables. 
This table shows the unconditional, pair-wise correlations of the variables used in the regression models. lnLM12 is the natural logarithm of Liu’s (2006) 
trading continuity measure (LM12) and LIQBETA is the liquidity beta from Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented CAPM (LCAMP). ECASH is the excess cash 
estimated as the residual of Equation (3); MTB is market value of assets divided by total assets; SIZE is the natural log of net assets deflated in 1994 dollars; 
LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt scaled by net assets; DIV is a dummy variable with a value of one if a firm pays dividend, and zero otherwise; CAPEX 
is capital expenditures scaled by net assets; R&D is research and development expenditure scaled by sales; PRICE is the stock price; RET is the stock return; 
NSHAR is the number of shareholders; BLOCK is the total block ownership; IO is the total shares outstanding held by 13F institutions; NASDAQ is a 
dummy variable equal to one for NSADAQ stocks, and zero otherwise. The values of ECASH, MTB, SIZE, LEVERAGE, DIV, CAPEX, R&D, PRICE, RET, 
NSHAR, BLOCK, IO, and NASDAQ are lagged in one period. Detailed variable definitions and sources are provided in Appendix A. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. 
a. lnLM12 1               
b. LIQBETA  0.07*** 1              
c. ECASH -0.06*** -0.05*** 1             
d. MTB -0.15*** -0.07*** 0 1            
e. SIZE -0.35*** 0.02** -0.02*** -0.22*** 1           
f. LEVERAGE -0.03*** 0.04*** 0 -0.10*** 0.23*** 1          
g. DIV -0.02*** 0.05*** -0.01* -0.08*** 0.37*** -0.03*** 1         
h. CAPEX -0.01 -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.12*** -0.07*** 0 -0.07*** 1        
i. R&D -0.05*** -0.04*** 0.01 0.25*** -0.27*** 0.06*** -0.16*** 0.09*** 1       
j. PRICE -0.20*** 0 0.03*** 0.22*** 0.53*** -0.04*** 0.32*** 0.01 -0.11*** 1      
k. RET -0.04*** -0.06*** 0 0.17*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.10*** -0.02*** 0.10*** 1     
l. NSHAR -0.20*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.01* 0.56*** 0.05*** 0.32*** -0.01 -0.07*** 0.30*** -0.02*** 1    
m. BLOCK 0.31*** 0.03*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.29*** 0.03*** -0.10*** 0.03*** -0.03*** -0.22*** -0.02* -0.28*** 1   
n. IO -0.27*** -0.03*** 0.05*** 0 0.32*** -0.01 0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.28*** 0.01 0.05*** -0.33*** 1  
o. NASDAQ 0.12*** -0.03*** 0.06*** 0.16*** -0.49*** -0.14*** -0.34*** 0.03*** 0.18*** -0.28*** 0.02*** -0.30*** 0.12*** -0.11*** 1 
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Table 3 
Excess cash and trading continuity. 
This table displays results for the OLS estimations of the baseline regression model (Equation (4)). The dependent variable is the liquidity measure and is 
measured in two different ways: (a) as the natural logarithm of Liu’s (2006) LM12 (𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑀12) and (b) as the liquidity beta (𝛽𝑖𝑙) in Equation (2) (𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴). 
Definitions of all dependent and independent variables can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The estimations include year and two-digit SIC industry 
dummies. The t-statistics, which are adjusted for clustering by firm and year, are reported in parentheses. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: lnLM12 
 
Dependent variable: LIQBETA 
 
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Subsample 
NYSE/AMEX 
Subsample 
NASDAQ  
Full 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
Subsample 
NYSE/AMEX 
Subsample 
NASDAQ 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
      
        
ECASH -0.038*** -0.035*** -0.018* -0.046***  -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.043*** -0.082*** 
 (-4.262) (-4.269) (-1.719) (-3.983)  (-6.256) (-6.177) (-3.799) (-5.552) 
MTB  -0.158*** -0.140*** -0.157***   -0.090*** -0.038** -0.103*** 
  (-10.652) (-8.102) (-9.725)   (-3.417) (-1.970) (-3.084) 
SIZE  -0.220*** -0.237*** -0.199***   -0.061** -0.037 -0.078*** 
  (-9.640) (-8.637) (-7.760)   (-2.351) (-1.177) (-3.106) 
LEVERAGE  0.185*** 0.211*** 0.140**   0.224** 0.176 0.239* 
  (3.715) (2.732) (2.473)   (2.489) (1.618) (1.916) 
DIV  0.129*** 0.062** 0.215***   0.121*** 0.091** 0.118** 
  (4.265) (1.990) (4.069)   (3.206) (2.136) (2.173) 
CAPEX  -0.686*** -0.987*** -0.518***   -0.621** -1.173** -0.093 
  (-4.500) (-4.289) (-2.670)   (-2.068) (-2.258) (-0.257) 
R&D  -0.169*** -0.037 -0.159***   -0.159 -0.070 -0.154 
  (-6.429) (-0.394) (-6.677)   (-1.489) (-0.304) (-1.605) 
PRICE  0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006***   0.003** 0.003** 0.003 
  (6.978) (6.276) (4.290)   (2.009) (2.329) (1.145) 
RET  -0.042** -0.043** -0.047**   -0.133*** -0.116* -0.125*** 
  (-2.474) (-2.251) (-2.573)   (-2.751) (-1.787) (-3.012) 
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NSHAR  0.027*** 0.056*** -0.014   0.070*** 0.061*** 0.064** 
  (3.066) (4.279) (-0.862)   (5.150) (4.039) (2.107) 
BLOCK  0.762*** 0.569*** 0.937***   0.075 0.012 0.119 
  (8.262) (6.561) (6.600)   (1.222) (0.236) (1.165) 
IO  -0.183*** -0.161*** -0.196***   -0.130* -0.143** -0.121 
  (-4.553) (-3.507) (-3.272)   (-1.892) (-2.007) (-1.124) 
NASDAQ  0.053     -0.032   
  (1.318)     (-0.809)   
lnLM12       0.078*** 0.075*** 0.089*** 
       (3.603) (2.884) (3.734) 
Constant 1.095*** 2.151*** 2.001*** 2.382***  0.498*** 0.654*** 0.384 0.838*** 
 (3.741) (7.409) (11.082) (4.020)  (3.127) (2.974) (1.305) (4.230) 
Observations 28,310 28,310 15,018 13,292  28,310 28,310 15,018 13,292 
Adjusted R-squared 0.063 0.273 0.253 0.318  0.031 0.043 0.051 0.052 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
38 
 
Table 4  
The joint effect of trading liquidity and excess cash on firm valuation.   
This table displays results for the OLS estimations of the valuation regression model (Equation (5)). The 
dependent variable Q is defined as the market capitalization of common stock plus book value of long-
term debt divided by total assets. The main independent variables are excess cash, trading liquidity and 
the interaction of these two.  Liquidity (LIQUIDITY) measure is either 𝑙𝑛𝐿𝑀12 or 𝐿𝐼𝑄𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴, which 
captures the trading activities during the current year. Following Roll et al. (2009), we include SIZE 
(market capitalization), TURNOVER (the sum of daily turnover over the prior 12 months), ROA (net 
income divided by total assets), CAPEX (capital expenditures by net assets), LTD (long-term debt divided 
by total assets), and DIV (dividend dummy which equals one if the firm pays a dividend, otherwise zero) 
as control variables in the regression. The t-statistics, which are adjusted for clustering by firm and year, 
are reported in parentheses. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variable: Q 
LIQUIDITY measures: lnLM12 LIQBETA 
      
ECASH -0.104*** -0.088*** 
 
(-5.269) (-5.513) 
LIQUIDITY -0.017 -0.026** 
 
(-0.633) (-2.099) 
ECASHxLIQUIDITY 0.039*** 0.009** 
 
(3.725) (2.234) 
SIZE 0.170*** 0.174*** 
 
(5.825) (6.919) 
TURNOVER 0.310*** 0.306*** 
 
(4.847) (4.953) 
ROA 0.294 0.294 
 
(0.515) (0.522) 
CAPEX 4.484*** 4.450*** 
 
(9.322) (9.359) 
LTD -1.354*** -1.347*** 
 
(-6.898) (-6.860) 
DIV -0.284*** -0.278*** 
 
(-5.081) (-5.178) 
Constant 1.193*** 1.161*** 
 
(3.846) (3.836) 
Observations 22,236 22,236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.198 0.198 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
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Table 5  
The results of the two-stage least squares instrumental variable (2SLS IV) regressions.  
In the first stage, we regress excess cash (ECASH) on a selected instrument variable and a set of control 
variables, including industry and year dummies. We use the natural logarithm of the industry average 
excess cash holding (IECASH) as our instrument. We use the predicted values of ECASH from the first-
stage regression in the second stage regressions. Further details on variable definitions and sources can be 
found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The t-values (for the first stage) and z-values (for the second stage) are 
reported in the parentheses and are computed from the heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors, 
clustered by firm. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 
  Dependent variables     
 
First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
  ECASH lnLM12 ECASH LIQBETA 
IECASH 1.047***  1.043***  
 
(0.025)  (0.025)  
ECASH (instrumented)  -0.043***  -0.091*** 
 
 (0.016)  (0.019) 
MTB -0.099*** -0.158*** -0.111*** -0.093*** 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) 
SIZE -0.057*** -0.220*** -0.074*** -0.063*** 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) 
LEVERAGE 0.474*** 0.188*** 0.487*** 0.234*** 
 
(0.077) (0.045) (0.077) (0.068) 
DIV 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.154*** 0.122*** 
 
(0.037) (0.026) (0.037) (0.027) 
CAPEX 1.410*** -0.673*** 1.353*** -0.582** 
 
(0.226) (0.135) (0.226) (0.245) 
R&D -0.182*** -0.170*** -0.195*** -0.162*** 
 
(0.031) (0.016) (0.031) (0.045) 
PRICE 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
RET -0.013 -0.042*** -0.016 -0.133*** 
 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.027) 
NSHAR 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.068*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.015) (0.009) (0.015) (0.013) 
BLOCK -0.033 0.761*** 0.026 0.076 
 (0.082) (0.060) (0.082) (0.068) 
IO 0.217*** -0.180*** 0.202*** -0.123*** 
 (0.053) (0.033) (0.053) (0.045) 
NASDAQ 0.141*** 0.054* 0.145*** -0.026 
 
(0.043) (0.031) (0.043) (0.030) 
lnLM12   -0.078*** 0.076*** 
 
  (0.019) (0.014) 
Constant -0.197  -0.029  
 
(0.207)  (0.203)  
Observations 28,310 28,310 28,310 28,310 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.283 0.241 0.285 0.023 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IV F-stat 1797.80***  1783.42*** 
 CD Wald F-stat 6874.43***   6838.26***   
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Table 6  
The results from the Fama-MacBeth (1973) method. 
This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression estimates of Equation (4). The dependent variable is 
either lnLM12 or LIQBETA. The regression models include control variables, which are defined in more 
details in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Dependent variables 
 
lnLM12 LIQBETA 
      
ECASH -0.042*** -0.068*** 
 
(-7.366) (-5.294) 
MTB -0.170*** -0.078** 
 
(-9.337) (-2.759) 
SIZE -0.250*** -0.055** 
 
(-9.842) (-2.100) 
LEVERAGE 0.257*** 0.291*** 
 
(6.278) (3.104) 
DIV 0.167*** 0.133*** 
 
(8.103) (3.464) 
CAPEX -0.432*** -0.395 
 
(-6.312) (-1.006) 
R&D -0.193*** -0.237** 
 
(-7.896) (-2.432) 
PRICE 0.007*** 0.003** 
 
(7.876) (2.212) 
RET -0.038* -0.118** 
 
(-2.066) (-2.417) 
NSHAR 0.050*** 0.087*** 
 
(6.219) (6.433) 
BLOCK 0.810*** 0.151 
 (9.210) (1.491) 
IO -0.205*** -0.122* 
 (-7.536) (-1.875) 
NASDAQ 0.062** -0.040 
 
(2.137) (-0.959) 
lnLM12  0.067** 
 
 (2.470) 
Constant 1.733*** 0.045 
 
(12.546) (0.215) 
Observations 28,310 28,310 
Average R-squared 0.261 0.083 
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Table 7 
Alternative liquidity measures. 
This table displays results from Equation (4) with Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity and the bid-ask spread as 
alternative liquidity measures. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity is defined as the average of the daily ratio of 
the absolute value of a stock’s return to its dollar volume over the past the past 12 months. The bid-ask 
spread is defined as the average value of the daily difference between ask price and bid price, divided by 
the ask price, over the past 12 months. All regressions include control variables, year and two-digit SIC 
industry dummies. The t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses and 
detailed variable definitions and sources can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Full Sample 
Subsample 
NYSE/AMEX 
Subsample  
NASDAQ 
Panel A. Dependent variable: Amihud (2002) Illiquidity 
ECASH -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.026*** 
 (-6.725) (-3.264) (-5.294) 
Observations 28,310 15,018 13,292 
Adjusted R-squared 0.121 0.109 0.135 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B. Dependent variable: Bid-ask spread  
ECASH -0.060*** 0.001 -0.092*** 
 (-6.389) (0.125) (-6.622) 
Observations 23,858 10,967 12,891 
Adjusted R-squared 0.636 0.674 0.669 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 8 
The role of financial constraints and growth opportunities. 
This table provides a summary of the estimation of Equation (6). We define financially constrained firms 
as those: (i) in the bottom three size deciles; (ii) that do not pay dividend; (iii) that do not have credit 
ratings; (iv) in the top three KZ index deciles; (v) in the top three WW index deciles; and (vi) in the top 
three HP index deciles. We use book-to-market equity ratios, R&D expenses, and capital expenditures as 
proxies for growth opportunities. At the beginning of each year, we calculate the mean value of each 
proxy of growth opportunities and set a dummy value to 1 (0) for firms with high (low) growth 
opportunities. All regressions include control variables, year and two-digit SIC industry dummies. The t-
statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses and detailed variable 
definitions and sources can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Interacted with financial constraint dummy (FC)       
 
Dependent variable: lnLM12       
FC measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxFC t-stat N Adj. R2 
Firm size 0.025*** (2.674) -0.129*** (-6.393) 18,779 0.323 
Payout ratio -0.010 (-0.831) -0.054*** (-3.440) 18,492 0.287 
Credit ratings 0.016* (1.932) -0.076*** (-5.663) 28,310 0.277 
KZ index -0.053*** (-3.022) 0.030 (1.478) 13,951 0.254 
WW index 0.024** (2.401) -0.103*** (-5.373) 18,247 0.294 
HP index -0.004 (-0.423) -0.082*** (-4.710) 13,697 0.281 
 
Dependent variable: LIQBETA       
FC measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxFC t-stat N Adj. R2 
Firm size -0.036** (-2.089) -0.052*** (-3.079) 18,779 0.038 
Payout ratio -0.028** (-2.132) -0.065** (-2.311) 18,492 0.042 
Credit ratings -0.061*** (-3.872) -0.006 (-0.444) 28,310 0.043 
KZ index -0.091*** (-5.412) 0.026 (1.101) 13,951 0.043 
WW index -0.026** (-2.025) -0.064*** (-3.075) 18,247 0.036 
HP index -0.011 (-0.572) -0.078*** (-2.961) 13,697 0.042 
              
Panel B: Interacted with growth opportunities dummy (GO) 
   
 
Dependent variable: lnLM12       
GO measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxGO t-stat N Adj. R2 
MTB -0.038*** (-3.869) 0.014 (1.188) 28,310 0.275 
R&D -0.024*** (-2.672) -0.059*** (-3.232) 28,310 0.275 
CAPEX -0.029*** (-3.032) -0.019* (-1.737) 28,310 0.273 
 
Dependent variable: LIQBETA       
GO measures: ECASH t-stat ECASHxGO t-stat N Adj. R2 
MTB -0.062*** (-5.905) -0.012 (-0.486) 28,310 0.043 
R&D -0.044*** (-4.760) -0.118*** (-2.676) 28,310 0.044 
CAPEX -0.057*** (-4.832) -0.023 (-1.251) 28,310 0.043 
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Table 9 
Sub-period analysis. 
This table presents the OLS regression estimates of Equation (4) for the period before and after 2008. To further investigate the role of crisis, Panel A report 
the results for three sub-periods: before 2008, 2008-2009, and after 2009 for the liquidity model with lnLM12 and LIQBETA, respectively. In Panel B, we use 
the US business cycle expansions and contractions information available in the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and identify the years 1991, 
2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009 as episodes of crisis and estimate Equation (4) separately for crisis and non-crisis periods. All regressions include control 
variables, year and two-digit SIC industry dummies. The t-statistics adjusted for clustering by firm and year are reported in parentheses and detailed variable 
definitions and sources can be found in Table 1 and Appendix A. The asterisks 
*
, 
**
, and 
***
 indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 Panel A: Dependent variable: lnLM12   Dependent variable: LIQBETA 
 
Before 2008 2008-2009 After 2009   Before 2008 2008-2009 After2009 
ECASH -0.046*** -0.025*** -0.006  -0.069*** -0.078*** -0.044*** 
 
(-5.063) (-3.736) (-0.941)  (-4.855) (-3.582) (-2.671) 
Observations 20,260 2,814 5,236  20,260 2,814 5,236 
Adjusted R-squared 0.299 0.155 0.159  0.051 0.075 0.040 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Dependent variable: lnLM12  Dependent variable: LIQBETA 
 
Off crisis (NBER) During crisis (NBER) 
 
Off crisis (NBER) During crisis (NBER) 
ECASH -0.036*** -0.031***  -0.072*** -0.035 
 
(-4.007) (-4.228)  (-6.829) (-1.210) 
Observations 23,122 5,188  23,122 5,188 
Adjusted R-squared 0.279 0.246  0.049 0.041 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
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Appendix A 
Variable definitions. 
The data sources are CRSP and Compustat unless specified otherwise. Data item codes are in Italics.  
 
lnLM12 A natural logarithm form of Liu (2006)’s stock liquidity measure, which is the 
standardized turnover-adjusted number of days with zero trading volumes over 
prior 12 months (LM12): LM12 = [ZEROS + (1/TURNOVER)/
DEFLATOR] ∗ 252/TRAD, where ZEROS is the total number of zero daily 
trading volumes in prior 12 months, TURNOVER is the sum of daily turnover 
over the prior 12 month, DEFLATOR is set to 11,000  as in Liu (2006) in 
order to ensure that 0 <
1/TURNOVER
DEFLATOR
< 1 for all stocks, and TRAD is the total 
number of trading days over the prior 12 months. 
LIQBETA The liquidity beta is estimated from Liu’s (2006) two-factor monthly time-
series regression of stock excess returns on market excess returns and a 
liquidity mimicking factor over the prior 12 months for firm i in a given year: 
rit − rft = αi + βim(rmt − rft) + βilLIQt,i + εit , where rit , rft , and  rmt  are 
monthly returns of firm i, US market, and one-month Treasury bill. Market 
return and one-month Treasury bill data is obtained from Kenneth French 
Website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html). 
LIQ is the mimicking liquidity, kindly provided by Weimin Liu More details 
on the construction of this factor can refer to Liu (2006, pp 550-551).  
ECASH The residual of a cross-sectional regression of cash holdings on firm 
characteristics (Equation (3)). The dependent variable is the natural log of cash 
and short-term investments (che) scaled by net assets (at-che). The 
independent variables include  the ratio of cash flows (ebitda-xint-txt-dvc) 
scaled by net assets;  the ratio of total debt (dltt+dlc) scaled by net assets; the 
market value of assets divided by total assets (at-ceq+(csho*prcc)/at); the 
natural log of net assets (at-che) deflated in 1994 dollars; net working capital 
(wcap-che), scaled by net assets; capital expenditures (capx) scaled by net 
assets;  a dummy variable with a value of one if a firm pays dividends (dvc) 
and zero, otherwise; research and development expenses (xrd) scaled by sales 
(sales); a dummy which equals to one if a firm is in a regulated industry 
(including railroads (SIC code 4011), trucking (SIC code 4210 and 4213), 
airlines (SIC code 4512), and telecom (SIC code 4812 and 4813)), and zero 
otherwise; industry cash flow risk, defined as the mean of the ratio of the 
standard deviations of cash flows dividend by the total assets over 20 years for 
firms in the same industry (2-digit SIC code).  
MTB The market value of assets divided by total assets (at-ceq+(csho*prcc)/at). 
SIZE The natural log of net assets (at-che) deflated in 1994 dollars. 
DIV A dummy variable with a value of one if a firm pays dividend (dvc) and zero, 
otherwise. 
CAPEX Capital expenditures scaled by net assets, (capx/(at-che)). 
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R&D Research and development expenses (xrd) scaled by sales (sale). 
PRICE The close price on a stock in a fiscal year (prcc_f). 
RET The stock’s holding period return from CRSP (ret). 
NSHAR The natural log of the number of common/ordinary shareholders (cshr). 
BLOCK The fraction of closely held shares held by blockholders, including officers, 
directors, trusts, pension/benefit plans. Data source: Worldscope.  
IO The fraction of total shares outstanding held by 13F institutions. Data source: 
Thomson Reuters Institutional Manages (13F) Holdings. 
NASDAQ A dummy variable equal to one for NSADAQ stocks (exchg=14), and 0 
otherwise. 
Financial constraints Measures: 
(a) Firm size: Constrained (unconstrained) firms are in the bottom (top) 
three deciles sorted by firm size (SIZE). 
(b) Payout ratio: Constrained (unconstrained) firms are in the bottom (top) 
three deciles sorted by payout ratio. Payout ratio is measured as the 
total payouts (dvc+prstkc) scaled by operating income (oibdp - txt - 
xint - dvc). 
(c) Credit rating: Unrated firms by S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer 
Credit Rating (splticrm) are classified as constrained, otherwise as 
financially unconstrained. 
(d) KZ index (Lamont, Polk, and Saa-Requejo, 2001):  
KZ = -1.001909*[(ib +dp)/ppent]+0.2826389*[ (at + (prcc_f*csho) - 
ceq - txdb)/at] +3.139193*[(dltt + dlc)/(dltt +dlc + seq)]-
39.3678*[(dvc + dvp)/ppent]-1.314759*[che/ppent], where ppent is 
the beginning of year t. 
(e) WW index (Whited and Wu, 2006; Hennessy and Whited, 2007): WW 
equals 1 if the total of common dividends and preferred dividends 
(dvc+dvp) is greater than zero, and 0 otherwise.  
(f) HP index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010):  
HP= -0.737*SIZE+0.043*SIZE2-0.04*age, where age is measures as 
the number of years since the firm’s inception. 
Using KZ index, WW index, and HP index, constrained (unconstrained) firms 
are those in the top (bottom) three deciles. 
Growth opportunities Measures: (a) MTB; (b) R&D; (c) CAPEX (capital expenditures scaled by net 
assets, (capx/(at-che)). The full sample is split by the mean value of growth 
opportunities measure. Those greater (less) than the mean value are growth 
(value) firms.  
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Highlights 
 
 We investigate how excess cash affects trading continuity and liquidity risk. 
 The increase in investors’ trading propensity reduces stock price exposure to shocks to 
market liquidity and the required liquidity premium. 
 The liquidity benefits of excess cash are greater for financially constrained firms and firms 
with high growth opportunities. 
 Findings are robust to alternative estimation methods and measures of liquidity. 
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
